It’s not often that The Onion accurately predicts a news story. But there’s a first time for everything.
The United States is literally sneaking out of Afghanistan in the middle of the night.. Our forces abandoned Bagham Air Force Base, a major hub of our operations in that country, under cover of darkness and without telling our Afghan allies that they were going to do it. They left behind huge caches of supplies and equipment, supposedly for the Afghans- who eventually found out that the Americans had left through the grapevine, shrugged, and moved in. But the Afghan army will have to make do with what the looters left for them.
The Biden administration’s Afghan policy seems to be identical to that of the Trump administration’s: get out of Dodge just as fast as our legs will carry us; do not pass go, do not collect $200. Our armed forces can’t be blamed, of course; they take orders from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. But our latest abandonment of our allies- something that is becoming a regular part of American foreign policy, and understandably causing them to conclude that the U.S. can’t be relied upon- is in some respects making the fall of Saigon look like the Alamo by comparison.
At least in Vietnam our final withdrawal came because we had lost the war and the enemy was attacking our ally’s capital city. But in the case of Afghanistan, we’ve yawned, stretched our arms, said “I’m tired and I’m going home,” and are in the process of letting the enemy win. Few doubt that they will- and given Taliban gains since we began a withdrawal that is now 90% complete, it will probably be rather quickly.
True, we have been fighting this “forever war” for twenty years. True, it’s been very expensive. But it’s cost us fewer than three thousand lives. By comparison, Vietnam cost us 57,000.
Contrary to what many people have claimed down through the years, it was not the great North Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the architect of Communist victories over both France and the United States, who was the source of the statement below. It was North Vietnamese Col. Bui Tin, who made it in a 1995 interview with the Wall Street Journal. But it’s hard to miss their significance both for our involvement in Afghanistan and in the future:
Q: How did Hanoi intend to defeat the Americans?
A: By fighting a long war which would break their will to help South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh said, “We don’t need to win military victories, we only need to hit them until they give up and get out.”
Bui goes on to explain that given the roles dissent and protest play in democracies, they cannot win protracted wars. Even though Bui doesn’t say so, that isn’t necessarily the case when everyone can clearly see that their own immediate welfare and that of the nation are on the line. But when the war is on the other side of the globe, and it’s hard to see the immediate consequences of failing to prevail, when a war begins to drag on and on- even if, as in Afghanistan, casualties have been minimal- the citizens of democracies tire of them. And in the long run, democracies will never be able to summon the will to see a lengthly foreign war to a successful conclusion unless the nation itself would be put in immediate danger if it failed to do so.
That, ultimately, was the lesson of Vietnam. We can win short, decisive conflicts. But in a war like Vietnam or even one like Afghanistan, in which casualties have been light, it is a built-in weakness of countries in which the people finally call the shots that unless there are obvious and fairly immediate consequences to losing, democracies simply cannot and will not stay the course..
That is a fact of life history has taught us at a considerable cost in lives and treasure. Both Donald Trump-style isolationists and George H.W. Bush and Lyndon Johnson-style internationalists should take it as a fundamental law of nature and govern their policies accordingly.
We forget that we went to war in Afghanistan originally because the Taliban was sheltering Osama bin Laden and al Queda in Afghanistan. The war was enormously popular in the United States at the time, and jolly well should have been. We kicked the Taliban out. The trouble is that Afghanistan, like Iraq, is an ancient and relatively undeveloped region, rather than a nation in the modern sense. Like Vietnam, and like Iraq, it is essentially an artificial nation cobbled together by outsiders. We defeated the Taliban, and removed them from power. But as in Iraq, we then faced the dilemma of lacking any abiding sense of mutual identity or a generally recognized central authority to install in power in place of our defeated adversary. The “forever war” has been a struggle to prevent the Taliban- which, like the Viet Minh and its successors in Vietnam, was the only truly unified force capable of forming a stable government, from stepping into what amounted to a vaccum and seizing power again.
The rule of the Taliban- a misogynistic outfit of religious fanatics intent on ruling by strict Sharia law- was a nightmare for the people of Afghanistan. It is a nightmare into which they are about to be plunged once more.
An aside: If you haven’t seen the movie Charlie Wilson’s War, based on the book by George Crille III, I highly recommend it. It’s a funny but also an important film, somewhat fictionalized but preserving the essense of what actually happened when a lovable and rather blatantly corrupt congressman combined with a bizarre collection of marginal characters inside and outside the CIA to get the Mujahideen- the Afghans fighting the Russians- Stinger missles and other military support which they could use to repel the invaders. Afghanistan was a far different experience for the Russians than it was for us. It’s misleading to call it the “Russian Vietnam,” as some do; we lost 57,000 soldiers and sailors in Vietnam, whereas the Soviet Union lost only 15,000 (our own loses in Afghanistan total 2,376). But it was enough to convince the Kremlin that the war was unwinnable, and get them to pull out.
The movie ends with a sad postscript about how, having won the trust and friendship of the Afghan people, we squandered them by losing interest and forgetting about Afghanistan. The result was the Taliban coming to power. History, it seems, repeats itself. But I can’t help but wonder what might have happened if our interest in a stable Afghanistan that wasn’t going to be a playground for bad actors had continued. Perhaps the “forever war” might never have been fought at all.
Effective and empathetic foreign aid when possible, and covert operations to support our friends, or even short, decisive military encounters when they are necessary, can and should be undertaken when they’re in our interests, and in the interests of freedom and stability. But not twenty-year wars, even when they result in fewer than 3,000 casualties over that entire period.
How do you avoid quagmires like Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan, in which we can keep the bad guys out of power only if we stay involved at a level we cannot sustain in the long run? First and foremost, you try to help avoid the circumstances in which they develop. But contrary to the paleocon/Trump/Buchanan/Paul isolationist instinct, we can’t simply shut ourselves within our own borders, behind the ramparts of two oceans, and cry “America First!” World War II proved how badly that works. Throughout history, there has always been a leading world power that has lent stability to world affairs. The Brits played that role for a long time. We are their successors. The alternative is a global power vacuum in which Hitlers arise. The days of “Fortress America” are far in the past. The world has become too small. We are too deeply effected, economically, culturally, and in many other ways by what happens on the otherside of the globe to curl up in a ball and hide.
And above all else, we can be mindful of our limitations. I’m not sure what the answer is when our military presence is or might be the only thing keeping tyrants and monsters from filling power vacuums on the other side of the world. But the Butterfly Effect is real in modern international affairs. It may be very indirectly, but we in the United States will be affected by the impending descent of Afghanistan back into the dark medieval night of Sharia law, misogyny and tyranny. And like it or not, history has cast us in the role the British played for so long, not necessarily as a world-bestriding empire but as a strong anchor for peace and order, a rallying point around which the nations can gather to protect the interests of peace and even civilization. 9/11 is a chilling reminder of what happens when we lose interest in what happens beyond our borders.
Multilateralism is part of the solution, to be sure. But then, our effort in Afghanistan has been multilateral; it’s been a NATO operation. And our NATO allies, too are democracies, subject to the short attention span of their voters.
I suppose the best we can do is to encourage enlightened people and movements non-militarily, and on a limited and even covert scale when military action must be taken, again unless it’s possible to bring overwhelming force to bear to bring about a clear, quick, decisive, limited, and well-defined outcome, as was the case in the First Gulf War.
We dare not run away from our responsibilities in the world because we cannot. The world will not let us. The fruit of any prolonged effort will be bitter indeed; as it is, the damage done to our posture in the world and our relationship with our allies by four years of Trump isolationism will probably take decades to repair. But there are limits, as a practical matter, to what even a democracy as mighty as ours can do. We need to learn those limits, stay within them, always keep a clear and limted goal in mind, and do the best we can. Reality is a harsh mistress, and we have no choice but to obey it. And in our misadventures around the world since the 50s, reality has spoken clearly, and keeps repeating itself, it seems.
We should not mishear it. We dare not respond to Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan by withdrawing from the world, or by failing what we can do to lead the world order in staving off chaos and disaster. If we won’t do it, China will- and the consequences won’t be pretty.
The Biden administration is doing its best to avoid a reprise of the disaster we experienced in the fall of Saigon. But there will be Afghans who have put their lives on the line to be our friends, and who will lose those lives because we have abandoned them. And that is a cause for deep shame.
We have lost only 2,367 lives in Afghanistan. Each of those lives is a universe for the friends and family of the casualties. But those are far fewer losses than we’ve experienced in previous wars. We are not leaving Afghanistan because the cost of staying would be too high. We are leaving, yes, because it seems unlikely given the nature of Afghanistan itself that we can finally prevail, unless perhaps we stay there for 50 or 75 or a hundred years. But fundamentally, we’re leaving because democracies can’t summon the political will to fight protracted wars unless they’re invaded, or in immediate danger of being invaded.
But leaving means that while no life lost in the defense of freedom and decency is ever spent in vain, those 2,367 lives will have been lost in a cause that failed. Perhaps if we’d paid more attention and done our nation-building in peacetime, the war would never have had to be fought and those men and women would still be alive. As it happened, we find ourselves in a situation in which final victory in Afghanistan is probably impossible. Yes, there is a case to be made for getting out before more lives are lost. But while on the whole I’m a supporter of the Biden administration, it ought to be a cause for shame that our withdrawal is not happening more thoughfully and deliberately, over a far longer period. It’s not the MRI’s and DVD’s and ordnance we’re leaving behind that bothers me.
It’s the people.
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